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ABSTRACT
Legal translation is a complex process requiring a translator to be
fully proficient not just in multiple languages, but also in both transla-
tion theory and the legal systems involved in a given text.  Despite this,
legal translation in the United States is completely unregulated.  The
European Union, by contrast, is committed to producing an equally
authentic version of all of its major documents in each of its twenty-
four official languages, and, as a result, has developed a highly spe-
cialized system for performing legal translations.  In this Note, I
examine translation theory, both in general and in the legal context,
and look at the United States’ and European Union’s systems as they
currently exist.  Finally, I consider what the United States can learn
from the European Union’s policies, as well as how those policies
* Boston University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2016. The Author would like to
thank Professor Anna di Robilant, Professor Daniela Caruso, Alex Moe, and Dana
Leib for their invaluable assistance in the development of this Note.
355
\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\34-2\BIN205.txt unknown Seq: 2  2-JUN-16 14:19
356 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:355
could influence a proposal for an American federal court translator
certification program.
INTRODUCTION
An American lawyer in Madrid is meeting a group of Spanish friends
for dinner.  As the group is exchanging pleasantries before the meal, one
of the Spaniards asks the American, “¿Co´mo llegaste?” (“How did you
get here?”).  The American, who has studied Spanish, is able to appropri-
ately respond, “Cogı´ el tren,” (“I took the train”) and the conversation
moves to more exciting subjects.
Some time later, that same American is meeting with a different group
of friends, this time in Mexico City, when the same question is posed.
The American gives an identical response, “Cogı´ el tren,” but instead of
moving on, the group of friends responds with a mixture of stunned
silence and snickering.  What changed?
What the American did not know is that the Spanish verb “coger,”
while completely innocuous in Spain (where it means “to take” or “to
catch”), is actually obscene in Mexico.  As a Spanish friend once
explained to me, “En Espan˜a, cogimos el autobu´s; en Me´xico, no cogen en
pu´blico,” which is to say that, “In Spain, we ‘coger’ the bus; in Mexico,
they don’t ‘coger’ in public.”
Even in the most informal of settings, working effectively across lan-
guages and cultures is no easy task.  As far as the American in the pre-
ceding example was concerned, she had given the same response both
times.  There were no grammatical or structural errors in what she said,
no problems with subject-verb agreement, and no conjugation errors.
Nevertheless, the perfect response in one setting was completely inappro-
priate in another nearly identical situation.
It should come as no surprise that these language issues are only com-
pounded in a legal context.  To begin with, it has been suggested that
even in a monolingual context, the legal process is inherently one of
translation.1  Introducing a foreign language into the mix, then, should
only be done with the utmost care.  Take a relatively straightforward
example: the meaning of the French word “contrat” includes what an
American lawyer would consider “conveyances” or “trusts,” (which is to
say, concepts not included in the English word “contract”) while exclud-
1 See generally Clark D. Cunningham, Legal Storytelling: A Tale of Two Clients:
Thinking About Law As Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989). See also id. at 2490
(“By thinking of herself as a translator, the lawyer becomes aware of how, in the
process of representing a client to others, meaning is created and lost.”); Jim Chen,
Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1263, 1269, 1286 (1995)
(explaining that the legal process has been described “as translation, as the rendering
of ordinary, nonlegal language into the patois of the legal system,” and that
“[l]earning the law is like learning a language”).
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ing other concepts that are included in “contract.”2  Even in this case, the
potential for serious error is obvious.  Practically speaking, unfortunately,
problems of translation and the law are rarely that simple, nor are they
new.  To see just how crucial proper translation has always been, consider
Foster v. Nielson, an 1829 Supreme Court decision where Chief Justice
Marshall was waylaid by an incredibly subtle translation problem.3
In Foster, the Court considered which of two claims to a single tract of
land in the newly acquired Florida territory would win out: a grant issued
by the King of Spain before the territory was transferred to the United
States, or a competing claim issued by the United States after its acquisi-
tion of the territory.4 The heart of the matter was Article 8 of the Adams-
Onı´s Treaty, which was the instrument that had officially transferred own-
ership of Florida from Spain to the United States.5  In the English version
of the treaty, the relevant portion of that Article reads:
All the grants of land made before the 24th of January, 1818, by his
Catholic Majesty, or by his lawful authorities, in the said territories
ceded by his Majesty to the United States, shall be ratified and con-
firmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent
that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained
under the dominion of his Catholic Majesty.6
In his opinion, Marshall focused on the phrase “shall be ratified and
confirmed,” and read the Article to mean two things: first, that the land
grants in question had to be ratified before they were official, and second,
that the Adams-Onı´s Treaty did not by itself ratify them.7  Once he had
reached those two conclusions, Marshall reasoned, “[T]he ratification and
confirmation which are promised must be the act of the legislature.  Until
such act shall be passed, the Court is not at liberty to disregard the
existing laws on the subject.”8  Accordingly, he found that the grant
issued by the United States, rather than the one issued by the King of
Spain, controlled.9
The problem with the Foster decision stems from the fact that the
Court relied solely on the English version of the Treaty.  In the Spanish
version, Article 8 says that the grants of land “quedara´n ratificadas y
2 Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39
AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 12-13 (1991).
3 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
4 Id. at 299-300.
5 Id. at 314 (finding that “sound construction of the eighth article” is the key to the
decision).
6 Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits Between the United States of America
and his Catholic Majesty, U.S.-Spain, art. 8, Feb. 22, 1819-Oct. 29, 1820, 8 Stat. L252
[hereinafter Adams-Onı´s].
7 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314-15.
8 Id. at 315.
9 Id.
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reconocidas,” which would be more accurately translated as “will remain
ratified and confirmed.”10  In technical terms, Marshall had read a deon-
tic modality into the word “shall” that did not exist in the Spanish version
of Article 8.11  Fortunately, only four years later, the Court had the
opportunity to revisit this exact issue.
Just as in Foster, in United States v. Percheman, the Court had to decide
the validity of a land grant by the Spanish crown during the period imme-
diately prior to United States’ acquisition of Florida.12  This time, how-
ever, the Court looked at both versions of the Adams-Onı´s Treaty, and,
realizing the distinction between the English and Spanish versions of
Article 8, decided to uphold the Spanish grant.13  Again writing for the
Court, Justice Marshall addressed the discrepancy with the Foster
decision:
The treaty was drawn up in the Spanish as well as in the English
language.  Both are originals, and were unquestionably intended by
the parties to be identical. . . . In [Foster] . . . [t]he Spanish part of the
treaty was not then brought to our view, and we then supposed that
there was no variance between them.  We did not suppose that there
was even a formal difference of expression in the same instru-
ment. . . .  Had this circumstance been known, we believe it would
have produced the construction which we now give to the article.14
While that realization came several years too late for Mr. Foster, taken
together, these two cases demonstrate the essential role that legal transla-
tion has played in American courts since the very beginning of the
republic.
As important as legal translation was in the 19th century, it can only be
considered more so today.  As of 2011, over 300 languages were spoken
in the United States, and the number of people who speak a language
other than English at home had increased by more than 150% since
1980.15  Despite the incredible linguistic diversity of the United States, to
10 Adams-Onı´s, supra note 6, art. 8. R
11 The deontic mode expresses that a given action is either required or permitted,
but not yet complete.  Modal verbs such as “can,” “may,” “will,” and “shall” do not
exist in Spanish in the same way that they do in English, and, because of that,
Marshall’s reading of Article 8, while reasonable when looking only at the English
version of the treaty, is incompatible with the Spanish version (to be clear, the
problem with the Foster decision stems from Justice Marshall’s reliance upon the
improper translation, not his reasoning).  For additional explanation of modal verbs,
see Rodney Huddleston, A Short Overview of English Syntax, UNIV. OF EDINBURGH,
www.lel.ed.ac.uk/grammar/overview.html at 6.5 (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
12 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 82-83 (1833).
13 Id. at 88-89.
14 Id.
15 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011 4, 5
(August 2013), www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-22.pdf.
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date there has been surprisingly little in the way of formal study of its
legal translation policies.16
Legal translation is an incredibly complex process requiring a transla-
tor to be fully proficient not just in multiple languages, but also in both
translation theory and at least one legal system (and possibly more when
working in international legal contexts).17  Despite this, legal translation
in the United States remains unregulated.18  The European Union, by
way of contrast, lies on the other end of the translation regulation spec-
trum: its Multilingual Policy obligates it to create twenty-four co-official
versions of all its major documents.19  In this Note, I will examine both
the United States’ and European Union’s systems as they currently exist
and consider what the United States can learn from the European
Union’s translation policies, as well as how the United States could adapt
those policies to create a federal court translation certification system.20
In Part I, I will examine the nature of translation, both generally and
specifically in the legal context, and I will outline some of the basic ele-
ments of translation theory and common difficulties that arise while
translating.  In Part II, I will look at existing language legislation in the
United States and the current state of American legal translation, after
which I will suggest why the status quo is in need of change.  In Part III, I
will perform a similar analysis of the language policies of the European
Union, paying particular attention to the Union’s Multilingualism Policy,
and its concept of the “Lawyer-Linguist.”  Finally, in Part IV, I will con-
sider how the United States could combine its existing policies and the
European Union policies discussed in Part III for use in federal courts.
I. WHAT IS TRANSLATION?
A. Translation Is Not . . .
It may be best to begin by explaining two things that translation is not.
First, translation is not a simple mechanical process; even the most bril-
liant of monolingual English speakers armed with the highest quality
Spanish-to-English dictionaries available would never be able to produce
a completely accurate translation of a document like the Adams-Onı´s
16 See Peter W. Schroth, Legal Translation, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 47, 47 (1986)
(“Despite its great practical importance, legal translation is little discussed.”).
17 See Sacco, supra note 2, at 11-12. R
18 See Grace Leonard, Patents and Translation, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 561, 568 (1994) (“In the U.S., translation is an unregulated field.”).
19 See Translation and the European Union, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Nov. 26,
2014), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/translating/index_en.htm [hereinafter
Translation and the European Union].
20 While the translation regulations proposed in this Note could, and arguably
should, be similarly applied at the state level, for simplicity’s sake, I will limit my
discussion to federal policy.
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Treaty.21  The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this problem in Eastern Air-
lines v. Floyd when it “recognize[d] that dictionary definitions may be too
general for purposes of [interpreting the French-language Warsaw Con-
vention].”22  At least some training in a foreign language is required
before one can effectively use a bilingual dictionary, as they generally list
only the most basic forms of words (i.e. “walk,” but not its conjugated
forms, such as “walks,” “walked,” or “walking;” or, to return to Foster
and Percheman, “quedar” but not “quedara´n”).23  This is to say nothing
of the complications that can arise from syntactical differences between
two languages, such as differences in word order and sentence structure,
or the problem of homographs, which are two or more words that are
spelled alike, such as “bear” (“to support”) and “bear” (the animal).24  If
one needs only to get a general sense of a text, then this method can work
wonders.  However, given the precision of meaning that is essential in
legal settings, it is not appropriate for legal translation.
Second, though the two terms are often used interchangeably,25 trans-
lation is not the same as interpretation.  Even the federal government
seems at times confused about the distinction: Federal Rule of Evidence
604 states that, “[a]n interpreter must be qualified and must give an oath
or affirmation to make a true translation.”26  Generally speaking, transla-
tion deals with written communication, and interpretation deals with spo-
ken communication.27  Put another way, translation can be thought of as
“the process of transferring ideas expressed in writing from one language
to another,” while interpretation “is the process by which the spoken
word is used when transferring meaning between languages.”28  Thus,
someone serving as an intermediary in a conversation between a lawyer
21 See generally Gerard-Rene de Groot & Conrad J.P. van Laer, The Dubious
Quality of Legal Dictionaries, 34 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 65 (2006).  For an amusing
demonstration of just how ineffective this brute force method of translation can be,
see JOSE´ DA FONSECA & PEDRO CAROLINO, ENGLISH AS SHE IS SPOKE, OR A JEST
IN SOBER EARNEST (1884), http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/30411/pg30411-
images.html.  This famously (and accidentally) bad Portuguese-to-English phrasebook
was prepared by “translating” a Portuguese-to-French phrasebook with a French-to-
English dictionary, and includes such useful phrases as, “What news tell me? All hairs
dresser are newsmonger,” and “I was no came that to know how you are.”
22 499 U.S. 530, 537 (1991).
23 Sarah Yates, Scaling the Tower of Babel Fish: An Analysis of the Machine
Translation of Legal Information, 98 LAW LIBR. J. 481, 482 (2006).
24 Id. at 484-85.
25 See, e.g., David Zachary Kaufman, What Did You Say? The Perils of Clients
Who Don’t Speak English, 24 GPSOLO 22 (2007).
26 FED. R. EVID. 604.
27 Nina L. Ivanichvili, Considerations in Selecting Interpreters and Translators,
COLO. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 39, 40.
28 On Choosing A Language Access Provider, LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY
(LEP), www.lep.gov/resources/leptatool.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
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and a client is an interpreter, rather than a translator.29  Even if during
the conversation, that person were asked to explain the meaning of a for-
eign language document, so long as he was giving an oral response, he
would still be interpreting, rather than translating.30
B. A Technical Definition
Translation occurs between a “language pair,” which consists of both a
“source language” and a “target language.”31  The source language is the
language in which a given document was originally written, and the target
language is the language into which that document is being translated.32
The “direction” in a given language pair is determined by which language
is the source and which is the target.33  A translator working from Span-
ish to English is working in one direction, for example, and another work-
ing from English to Spanish can be thought of as working in the opposite
direction.  Most translators do not work in both directions in a language
pair, but rather work from a non-native language into their native lan-
guage.34  With those component parts in mind, it is time to define what
translation actually is.
Lawrence Lessig offers the following technical definition: “Translation
is the process by which texts in one language are transformed into texts of
another language, by constructing a text in the second language with the
same meaning as the text in the first.”35  According to Lessig, this hap-
pens via a two-step process: first, a translator must come to a complete
understanding of the material in the source language (which he deems
“familiarity”), and second, the translator must find an equivalent mean-
ing in the target language (which he deems “equivalence”).36
In order to achieve familiarity with a document, a translator must
understand not only its literal meaning, but also its meaning in context,
29 See, e.g., FAQs, CALIFORNIA COURTS, www.courts.ca.gov/2683.htm (last visited
March 14, 2016) (“[C]ourt interpreters interpret in civil or criminal court proceedings
. . . for witnesses or defendants who speak or understand little or no English.”).
30 Unlike legal translators, court interpreters in the United States are already
regulated by the federal government, and as such, interpretation falls generally
outside of the scope of this Note. However, given how closely related the two
practices are, interpretation will be discussed in at least some detail. See Court
Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2012).
31 Leonard, supra note 18, at 569. R
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1189 (1993). See
also Sacco, supra note 2, at 13-14 (“To translate, one must establish the meaning of R
the phrase to be translated and find the right phrase to express the meaning in the
language of the translation.”).
36 Lessig, supra note 35, at 1194. R
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and how that meaning relates to the end goal of the translation.37  A
translator achieves familiarity when he or she “knows . . . [a document’s]
purpose, the assumptions that underlie it, the scope of its reach, and theo-
ries it embraces.”38 Obviously, this is no easy task, nor is it one that can
be accomplished with only knowledge of the languages involved.  A
translator must understand not only the “what” of a document, but also
the “why” and the “how.”
Once a translator has achieved the requisite familiarity, the next step is
to find the document’s equivalent meaning in the target language.39
There are a number of schools of thought as to the best way to find this
equivalence, but for legal translation purposes, the goal is essentially to
“construct in the target language what the author in the source language
would have written, had the author been in the target context.”40  To
return to an earlier example, this means that when translating a docu-
ment from French to English, the translator would want to make sure of
the sense in which the word “contrat” was being used before simply trans-
lating it into English as “contract.”41
C. Common Translation Problems and Their Solutions
That example shows the principal difficulty of legal translation: a legal
translator works not simply across languages, but across legal languages,
which are subsets of languages that take their meaning from specific legal
systems.42  A language contains as many legal languages as there are legal
systems operating in that language;43 thus, the legal language of the
United States is not the same as the legal language of the United King-
dom, though proceedings in both countries occur in English.  Often, a
word in a legal language may appear identical to a word in the non-legal
version of that language but have its own specific meaning.  The concepts
of death and personhood, for example, have highly specific technical
meanings attached to them in legal languages that do not exist in their
common usage.44  While a word may have what is on its face an obviously
equivalent term in a target language (such as “contract” for “contrat”), a
legal translator must have an in-depth understanding of both the source
37 Id. at 1196.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Sacco, supra note 2, at 12-13. See also Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The R
“Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919, 927 (1990) (examining
multiple potential translations of the word “force” in English, German, and French).
42 See de Groot & van Laer, supra note 21, at 66. R
43 Id.  See also Sacco, supra note 2, at 11 (“The French language, for example, R
combines the legal language of France, of Quebec, and of Switzerland.”).
44 See Edgardo Rotman, The Inherent Problems of Legal Translation: Theoretical
Aspects, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 195 (1995).
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and target legal systems in addition to the source and target languages
before she can decide whether that term really is appropriate.45
Most problems in the translation process (legal or otherwise) occur
when there is a “gap” between the source language and the target lan-
guage.46  These gaps arise when information is presented in a document
that does not easily transfer to the target language, or when information
is required in the target language that is not presented in the document.47
Consider the Spanish word “amiga,” which means “a female friend.”
Translating “amiga” into English with only the word “friend” loses some
of the original meaning, while translating “amiga” as “female friend” or
“friend who is female” sounds awkward, and translating it as “girl friend”
seems to mean something else entirely.  Conversely, the English word
“friend” on its own is missing some of the information required to prop-
erly translate it from English into Spanish (namely, the gender of the per-
son in question).48
In a perfect world, each word in a source document would map pre-
cisely onto a word in the target language.  In practice, that is unlikely to
ever happen.  When no equivalent term exists for a given word or phrase
in the target language, translators have three basic options:49
1. Preserve the source term: The translator can either keep the term
as it is in the source language or provide a literal translation, clari-
fying its meaning via a parenthetical statement or a footnote.  This
is best done sparingly, to avoid “making the translation into a col-
lection of foreign words glued together by prepositions, adverbs,
and verbs from the target language.”50
2. Paraphrase: The translator can attempt to simply write around the
linguistic gap, describing the source term rather than translating
45 Lessig, supra note 35, at 1194. R
46 See id. at 1201.
47 Id.
48 Clark Cunningham gives the following description of the gap problem in
monolingual legal contexts: “[T]he lawyer as translator must creatively bridge at least
two gaps.  First, the lawyer must identify and cross the gap between what the client
says and what can be said in the language of the law. . . . [T]he lawyer must also deal
with the gap in meaning in the other direction, from what is said by the judge or other
lawyers back to the client.  [The lawyer is thus challenged] to a constant process of
educating herself, her client, and the other legal actors to the ways in which both lay
and legal language diminish and expand what we know about experience.”
Cunningham, supra note 1, at 2491-92. R
49 See de Groot & van Laer, supra note 21, at 68-71; Sacco, supra note 2, at 19-20. R
50 See de Groot & van Laer, supra note 21, at 68; Sacco, supra note 2, at 19 (“When R
a [translator] . . . cannot refer to a definition provided explicitly or implicitly by the
legislator or the case law . . . he may prefer not to translate.”).
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it.  This strategy works best when the paraphrase is succinct and
used relatively infrequently.51
3. Coin a neologism: The translator can use a term from outside of
the normal scope of the target language.  While this may seem like
the most attractive option at first, in many ways it requires the
greatest deal of care to ensure that the neologism being coined
does not already have its own meaning in the target language.
The French “droit commun” would be a poor choice to translate
the term “common law,” for example, as it already has its own
distinct significance.52
In the end, the individual translator determines the best way to bridge
a linguistic gap, and for that reason, translation can be considered almost
as much an art as it is a science.  Therefore, it is particularly important
that a legal translator be an expert not just in the source and target lan-
guages, but also in any legal systems involved in a translation.  When
translating literature, some loss of “flavor” may be inevitable given how
closely the placement of words can be related to the overall aesthetic
value of a given work.53  When translating a legal document, however,
any such loss of meaning is clearly unacceptable.54  It is the legal transla-
tor’s job to ensure that does not happen.
II. LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Current Legislative Landscape
While the United States does not have an official language at the fed-
eral level,55 thirty-one states have declared English their official state lan-
51 See de Groot & van Laer, supra note 21, at 70; Sacco, supra note 2, at 19 (“[A R
translator] may pick the closest term available to him in the language he is using,
identifying the differences between it and the term in the original language, and then
taking care that these problems are irrelevant from the standpoint of the problem he
is addressing.”).
52 See de Groot & van Laer, supra note 21, at 70; Sacco, supra note 2, at 20 (“[A R
translator] may create a special neologism in his own language.”).
53 See Rotman, supra note 44, at 189. R
54 See Schroth, supra note 16, at 57 (“A translator of a novel has the luxury of R
making up for what is omitted here by developing it there.  But in translating a treaty
or a contract, one must consider the very likely possibility of interpretation of a
sentence or a section out of context.  Hence whatever clarification there is to be must
accompany the very passage to be clarified.”).
55 One semi-exception is the Jones Act, which states that, “all pleadings and
proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico shall
be conducted in the English language.” 48 U.S.C. § 864 (2012).  Additionally, the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) requires all immigrants to the U.S. to
demonstrate “an understanding of the English language,” via the ability to “read and
write simple [English] words and phrases” prior to their naturalization. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1423(a)(1) (2012).  However, as neither the Jones Act nor the INA mandate
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guage.56  These declarations range in form and effect from simple
acknowledgements to active restrictions on state action in any other lan-
guage.57  In Illinois, the adoption of English as the official state language
is completely symbolic: the entirety of the relevant law reads, “The offi-
cial language of the State of Illinois is English,”58 and the Seventh Circuit
has noted that, “[t]his statute (which appears with others naming the state
bird and the state song) has never been used to prevent publication of
official materials in other languages.  In fact, various state and city agen-
cies publish materials and provide many services in Spanish.”59  For more
than four decades before that law was passed, the official state language
had been “American,”60 so it would seem the state has never considered
its “official language” a particularly practical matter.61  That is not the
case in Iowa, however.62  The significantly more substantive “Iowa
English Language Reaffirmation Act,” provides in part that, “All official
documents, regulations, orders, transactions, proceedings, programs,
meetings, publications, or actions taken or issued, which are conducted or
regulated by, or on behalf of, or representing the state and all of its politi-
cal subdivisions shall be in the English language.”63  In 2008, a state court
held that this Act made it illegal to publish official voter registration
forms in any language other than English.64  Clearly, then, these laws are
not all amusing political curios; they can and do have significant real-
world consequences.
methods of translation or interpretation in the courts, for the purposes of this Note,
they will not be considered further.
56 U.S. States with Official English Laws, U.S. ENGLISH, www.us-english.org/view/
13 (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).  For a fantastic (but slightly dated) summary of American
language legislation circa 2012, see Language Legislation in the U.S.A., LANGUAGE
POLICY (Feb. 1, 2012), www.languagepolicy.net/archives/langleg.htm.
57 See Evan L. Seite, Note, Language Legislation in Iowa: Lessons Learned from
the Enactment and Application of the Iowa English Language Reaffirmation Act, 95
IOWA L. REV. 1369, 1389-90 (2010) (explaining the difference between “symbolic”
and “non-symbolic” language legislation).
58 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/20 (2014).
59 Puerto Rican Org. for Pol. Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1973).
60 “American,” I should point out, is not an actual language.
61 See Dennis Baron, Language Laws and Related Court Decisions, UNIV. OF
ILLINOIS, URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, http://www.english.illinois.edu/-people-/faculty/
debaron/essays/langlaw.htm (stating that the 1923 law was repealed in 1969).
62 See IOWA CODE § 1.18 (2014).
63 Id.
64 King v. Mauro, No. CV6739, slip op. at 31 (D. Iowa Mar. 31, 2008) (“[T]he
Respondents are enjoined from using languages other than English in the official
voter registration forms of this state.”).
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At the national level, beginning in 1981, a number of unsuccessful
efforts have been made to grant English “official language” status.65  The
movement’s supporters insist that requiring the use of English would
both help to better integrate immigrants into American public life and cut
back on unnecessary government spending.66  Its opponents claim that
such a policy would unfairly penalize recent immigrants and others of
limited English proficiency,67 and point out that the founding fathers
themselves understood the importance of communicating across multiple
languages.68  The debate over these so-called “Official English” laws has
been raging for decades and is already shaping policy in states like Iowa;
clearly this is an issue of great practical importance.
B. The Court Interpreters Act
Although the United States does not currently regulate translation of
any kind, there is a system in place for certifying interpreters for use in
the federal courts.69  The Court Interpreters Act obliges the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to “establish a pro-
gram to facilitate the use of certified and otherwise qualified interpreters
in judicial proceedings instituted by the United States.”70 The Adminis-
trative Office divides interpreters into three classes:71
1. Certified Interpreters: Certified interpreters have passed the
Administrative Office’s rigorous certification examination pro-
65 For a summary of early “Official English” efforts, see Jose Roberto Juarez, Jr.,
The American Tradition of Language Rights: The Forgotten Right to Government in a
“Known Tongue,” 13 LAW & INEQ. 443, 450 n.21 (1995).
66 See Brandon Brice, Why English Should Be the Official Language of the United
States, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/
31/why-english-should-be-official-language-united-sta/.
67 See ACLU Backgrounder on English Only Policies in Congress, ACLU, http://
www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-backgrounder-english-only-policies-congress
(last visited Jan. 1, 2016). See generally Leila Sadat Wexler, Official English,
Nationalism and Linguistic Terror: A French Lesson, 71 WASH. L. Rev. 285 (1996)
(concluding that the Official English movement is “ill-conceived and unwarranted”).
68 Adriana Resendez, Comment, The Spanish Predominant Language Ordinance:
Is Spanish on the Way In and English on the Way Out?, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 317, 327-
28 (2001) (“Throughout the colonial struggle, American revolutionary leaders
understood the importance of multilingual communication in gaining independence
from Great Britain.  For example, the Continental Congress published excerpts of
declarations, articles and other documents in both German and English.  More
notably, early colonial leaders distributed the Articles of Confederation and other
political materials in French and English.”).
69 See Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2012).
70 Id.
71 Three Classes of Interpreters, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, http://www
.uscourts.gov/services-forms/federal-court-interpreters/interpreter-categories (last
visited Jan. 1, 2016).
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cess.  Certification programs exist for Spanish, Navajo, and Hai-
tian Creole, though only the Spanish certification program is still
administered.  This is the highest-level classification of
interpreter.72
2. Professionally Qualified Interpreters: This qualification exists for
all languages without any current Certified Interpreters.  Creden-
tials are established by having passed the State Department inter-
preter test in a language pair that includes English and the target
language, having passed the United Nations interpreter test in a
language pair that includes English and the target language, or by
being a member in good standing of the Association Internatio-
nale des Interpre`tes de Confe´rence or the American Association
of Language Specialists.73
3. Language Skilled/Ad Hoc Interpreters: An interpreter who does
not qualify as a Professionally Qualified interpreter but demon-
strates to the satisfaction of the court their ability to interpret
court proceedings from English into a designated language and
from that language into English is considered a language skilled/
ad hoc interpreter.74
The federal government, via the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, is clearly capable of crafting a sensible foreign language-
related policy, which bodes well should it ever turn its attention to tack-
ling the issue of translation.
C. Translation in the Courts
As mentioned above, Federal Rule of Evidence 604 states that, “[a]n
interpreter must be qualified and must give an oath or affirmation to
make a true translation.”75  The Rule is at best ambiguous as to whether
it means to apply to translators.  In practice, courts consider both transla-
tors and interpreters to be expert witnesses,76 as both must be “qualified
. . . by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to perform
their functions.77
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 FED. R. EVID. 604.
76 See Clifford S. Fishman, Recordings, Transcripts, and Translations as Evidence,
81 WASH. L. REV. 473, 503 (2006) (explaining that translators are “governed by the
rules regulating expert opinion testimony”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy
of Testimony Post-Kumho: Refocusing on the Bottomlines of Reliability and Necessity,
30 CUMB. L. REV. 185, 211 n.150 (2000) (noting that translators as well as interpreters
are considered experts).  On linguists serving as expert witnesses in other contexts,
see generally Judith Levi, Language as Evidence: The Linguist as Expert Witness in
North American Courts, 1 INT’L J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE & L. 1 (1994).
77 FED. R. EVID. 702.
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While parties to a lawsuit will produce official-sounding “certified
translations” of their foreign language documents, this designation simply
means that these documents contain a notarized statement by the transla-
tor or translating organization stating that they believe the translation “to
be accurate and complete.”78  As one commentator noted, “[a]nyone can
claim to be a translator, buy business cards, and write a resume support-
ing the claim.  There are no regulations requiring certification, accredita-
tion, or licenses.”79  A certified translation, therefore, is only worth as
much as the translator who certified it.
The bottom line is that the reliability and accuracy of a certified trans-
lation can vary wildly, and that translation in the courts is therefore at the
mercy of the adversarial system: if one party submits a translation that
the other party finds inadequate, then the objecting party must submit its
own translation and allow the fact-finder to decide the matter.80  Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 706, judges have the authority to appoint their
own expert witnesses, and so could theoretically order their own transla-
tion of a document.81  The exercise of this appointment power has been
highly criticized, however, and rightly so; in a subject as complex as legal
translation, adding another opinion to the fray is as likely as not to con-
fuse matters further, especially without a well-established way of deter-
mining the legitimacy of a translator’s qualifications and ability.82
Given the degree of expertise needed to notice an error such as the
“shall” problem Justice Marshall struggled with in Foster,83 placing the
onus on either the opposing party or the judge to spot problems in a
translation is clearly problematic.  When considering the increasing num-
ber of Americans who do not speak English well (or at all),84 the need for
an effective and reliable system of translation regulation in the United
States should be clear.  Failing to address this problem will restrict the
access of low-income and limited-English-proficiency Americans to the
courts, effectively transforming them into second-class citizens.85  One
solution is to establish what could be thought of as a “Federal Translation
78 Ivanichvili, supra note 27, at 42. R
79 Leonard, supra note 18, at 568. R
80 See Fishman, supra note 76, at 501-03. R
81 FED. R. EVID. 706.
82 See generally Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific
Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59 (1998) (arguing that this
practice blurs the line between Judge and advocate); Samuel R. Gross, Expert
Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113 (1991) (finding that expert evidence often makes
poor use of specialized knowledge, and at great cost to the parties and the legal
system).
83 See supra Introduction.
84 See Rotman, supra note 44, at 192. R
85 Paul Connor Hale, Note, Official, National, Common or Unifying: Do Words
Giving Legal Status to Language Diminish Linguistic Human Rights?, 36 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 221, 223 (2007).
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Certification” program, drawing on the system now in place for Federal
Court Interpreters.86  However, such a program could not simply be
grafted on to the existing process.  For one thing, the actual act of transla-
tion would be taking place outside of the courtroom, rather than within it,
as in the case with interpretation.  For another, while they are admittedly
related, translation is a distinct process from interpretation.87  In the
courts, the focus of interpretation is on rapidly transferring the meaning
of what is said from one language to another to facilitate the proceedings;
by contrast, the speed with which a translation is performed (so long as it
is carefully done) is irrelevant to the final product, as that is all that the
courts will see.88  Accuracy is important in courtroom interpretation, of
course, but not in the same way that it is in translation.  Given that the
ideal legal translator will have both legal and linguistic expertise, a court-
room translation regulation system should take that into account.  For
ideas as to how to best handle such a large-scale translation program, I
turn now to the European Union, which has acquired a certain degree of
expertise in the matter.
III. LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
With the entry of Croatia in 2013, the European Union now has
twenty-eight member states and twenty-four official languages.89  Unlike
in the Illinois example above,90 where English’s official status has no real
world impact, a language’s status in the European Union means a great
deal.91  Under its “Multilingualism Policy,” the Union is obligated to pro-
duce an official version of all regulations and other legislative documents
86 A particular advantage would be the ease with which such a certification
program could be adapted to provide translators for use in state courts, as well.
87 See supra Part I(A).
88 See CALIFORNIA COURTS, supra note 29 (“Court interpreters shift between two R
different languages, in real time”).
89 There are fewer official languages than member states because several member
states share official languages. EU Member Countries, EUROPEAN UNION, http://
europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 1,
2016); Official EU Languages, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Mar. 3, 2015), ec.europa.eu/
dgs/translation/translating/officiallanguages/index_en.htm [hereinafter Official EU
Languages].
90 See supra Part II(A).
91 See Nathaniel Berman, Nationalism Legal and Linguistic: The Teachings of
European Jurisprudence, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1515, 1517 (1992) (“[F]or over
a century [language] has been a crucial element, often the crucial element, in
European Nationalists’ understanding of identity”).
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in each of the official languages.92  This policy is unique in scope and
ambition across all international organizations.93
A. The Evolution of the Multilingualism Policy
The Multilingualism Policy has been a part of the European Union
from the very beginning.  While the 1957 Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community, also known as the Treaty of Rome, did not
explicitly create the policy, it opened the door by stating that, “The rules
governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall . . . be
determined by the Council, acting unanimously.”94  The Treaty also made
a point of noting that it was “drawn up in a single original in the Dutch,
French, German and Italian languages, [with] all four texts being equally
authentic.”95  There was nothing novel about that in the context of multil-
ingual treaties,96 but it serves to further underline how, from its inception,
the very identity of the European Union has been tied to multilingualism.
The following year, in 1958, the very first Regulation of the Council of
the European Economic Community formally laid the groundwork for
the Multilingualism Policy.97  It declared that “[t]he official languages and
the working languages of the institutions of the Community shall be
Dutch, French, German and Italian,”98 and required, among other things,
both that “Regulations and other documents of general application shall
92 See Multilingualism, EUROPEAN UNION (Jan. 22, 2015), europa.eu/pol/mult/
index_en.htm [hereinafter Multilingualism]; Translation and the European Union,
supra note 19.  Currently, only regulations adopted by both the EU Council and the R
European Parliament are translated into Irish, though this is a temporary
arrangement. Id. For more information on the current status of Irish, see Samuel
Morgan, Irish to be Given Full Official EU Language Status, EURACTIVE (Dec. 10,
2015), https://www.euractiv.com/section/languages-culture/news/irish-to-be-given-full-
official-eu-language-status/.
93 See Theodor Schilling, Language Rights in the European Union, 9 GERMAN L.J.
1219, 1223 (2008) (“The language regimes of traditional International Organisations
are quite different [from that of the EU].  To give but a few examples, the United
Nations . . . has only five Charter languages, . . . [t]he World Trade Organization . . .
makes do with three official languages . . . [and] [t]he Council of Europe . . . contents
itself with . . . two official languages.”).
94 EEC Treaty art. 217 (as in effect 1958) (now TFEU art. 342), ec.europa.eu/
archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf.
95 Id.
96 For example, Justice Marshall’s opinion in United States v. Percheman, discussed
in the introduction, discussed this concept in the context of the Adams-Onı´s Treaty.
See 32 U.S. 51, 88 (1833) (“The treaty was drawn up in the Spanish as well as in the
English language. Both are originals, and were unquestionably intended by the parties
to be identical.”).
97 Council Regulation 1, determining the languages to be used by the European
Economic Community, 1958 O.J. 385/58 (EC).
98 Id. art 1.
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be drafted in the four official languages,”99 and that “The Official Journal
of the Community shall be published in the four official languages.”100
That Resolution has been regularly amended to add the official language
of each subsequent member state to the list,101 and every EU citizen has
the right to both communicate with the major EU institutions in any of
the official languages, and receive a response in the language in which
they initiated that communication.102  The Council has repeatedly
stressed the importance of foreign language education for EU citizens,103
and has expressed its desire for every citizen to be able to speak two
languages in addition to their mother tongue.104
The importance of multilingualism is evident throughout the European
Union’s foundational documents.  The Treaty on European Union
stresses the need for the EU to “respect its rich cultural and linguistic
diversity,”105 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union includes among its provisions “respect [for] cultural, religious, and
linguistic diversity.”106  It is not an accident that the Charter places lan-
guage in the same section as concepts as fundamental as “religion” and
“culture”; it is a clear acknowledgement of the critical role that multil-
ingualism plays in the European Union.
Unsurprisingly, having twenty-four official languages and a mandate to
produce a wide range of documents in each of them results in an incredi-
ble workload.  The exponential formula (n^2-n) yields the number of lan-
guage pairs resulting from n languages;107 for the present day European
99 Id. art. 4.
100 Id. art. 5.
101 See Council Regulation 920/2005, art. 1, 2005 O.J. (L 156) 3 (updating Article 1
of the Regulation to say, “The official languages and the working languages of the
institutions of the European Union shall be Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian,
Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian,
Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish,” and updating
the rest of the articles to refer to the “21 official languages.”); Council Regulation
1791/2006, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 363) (updating the list to include Bulgarian and
Romanian);  Council Regulation 517/2013, art. 1, sec. 1 (p), 2013 O.J. (L 158) 1
(updating the list to include Croatian).
102 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 24, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
103 See generally Council Resolution of 31 March 1995 on improving and
diversifying language learning and teaching within the education systems of the
European Union; Council Resolution of 16 December 1997 on the early teaching of
European Union languages, 1998 O.J. (C 1) 2s.
104 Multilingualism, supra note 92. R
105 TFEU art. 3.
106 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 22, Dec. 18, 2000,
2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
107 See Jonathan Yim, Note, Feasibility of the Language Policy of the European
Union, 41 INT’L LAW. 127, 129 (2007).
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Union, with an n of twenty-four, there are five hundred fifty-two poten-
tial language pairs in play.108  Things are not quite as complicated as that
would imply, however; while the various bodies of the Union technically
could choose to work in any of the official languages, they draft almost
exclusively in English or French, meaning that fewer than fifty language
pairs are likely to come up in ordinary contexts.109  Nevertheless, the
translation needs of the European Union are massive, and to meet those
needs, the major EU bodies all have their own in-house translation
departments (for example, the Directorate General for Translation,
which handles the translation needs of the European Commission), and
the various EU agencies share a translation center in Luxembourg.110
The amount of manpower and resources required by the Multilingual-
ism Policy is staggering: in 2002, when the Union had a relatively small n-
value of eleven (and so only one hundred ten potential language pairs),
about one in every eight officials working for the European Union was a
translator.111  In 2004, with an n-value of twenty (and thus three hundred
eighty potential language pairs),112 an incredible one in three European
Union officials were translators or interpreters.113  In 2002, it was esti-
mated that all EU institutions combined translated more than 3 million
pages per year;114 in 2014, the Directorate General for Translation alone
(which is to say, only one of the seven major EU translation bodies)
108 Official EU Languages, supra note 89. R
109 Samantha Hargitt, What Could Be Gained in Translation: Legal Language and
Lawyer-Linguists in a Globalized World, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425, 439
(2013) (“The European Union writes directives in either French or English and then
must translate them into each of the official national languages of the member
States”); Olga Łachacz & Rafał Man´ko, Multilingualism at the Court of Justice of the
European Union: Theoretical and Practical Aspects, 34(47) STUD. LOGIC, GRAMMAR
& RHETORIC 75, 80 (“Approximately 95% of legal texts adopted in co-decision
procedures are drafted, scrutinised and revised in English.  For practical reasons
English has become a primary language used in the daily work of the institutions . . .
except for the [Court of Justice of the European Union], where for the same reasons
French dominates.”); Gerd Toscani, Translation and Law – The Multilingual Context
of the European Union Institutions, 30 INT’L J. LEGAL  INFO. 288, 294 (2002) (“A
great deal of the daily administrative paperwork and much of the preparatory work
for legislation is drafted and discussed by officials in-house in only one or two
procedural or working languages, in practice English and/or French, with an
increasing tendency towards English.”). See also Yim, supra note 107, at 129 R
(explaining that the unofficial hierarchy of languages within the EU is, “in order of
importance, English, French, German, and ‘the rest.’”).
110 Translation and the European Union, supra note 19. R
111 Toscani, supra note 109, at 292. R
112 Official EU Languages, supra note 89. R
113 Yim, supra note 107, at 129. R
114 Toscani, supra note 109, at 295. R
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translated 2.3 million pages at an estimated cost of C= 330 million.115  In
1999, the EU spent roughly C= 685.9 million on translation and interpreta-
tion services.116  Today, the total cost of translation services alone across
all EU institutions is estimated to be around C= 2 per citizen.117  When
multiplied by the current population of the European Union (about 503
million),118 that leads to the conclusion that the EU now spends over C= 1
billion per year on translation services, or more than $1.09 billion US.119
B. The Rise of the Lawyer-Linguist
Originally, the European Union dealt with questions of legal drafting
and translation separately, but it quickly found that there was often a
significant disconnect between policymakers and translators which raised
concerns about the quality of the translated texts, in particular regarding
the lack of equivalence between the multiple supposedly identical transla-
tions of a given document.120  To address those concerns, the EU began
recruiting lawyers skilled in multiple languages to compare documents
across their official translations.  These specialists came to be known as
“lawyer-linguists,”121 because, as the title implies, they are trained to
work on both legal and linguistic matters.  A recruitment brochure for
English-language lawyer-linguists at the Court of Justice of the European
Union in Luxembourg listed the following among the necessary
qualifications:
• Perfect command of English;
• Thorough knowledge of French;
115 Frequently Asked Questions About DG Translation, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(Oct. 28, 2015), ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/faq/index_en.htm [hereinafter Frequently
Asked Questions]; Translation and the European Union, supra note 19 (listing the R
major EU translation bodies).
116 Toscani, supra note 109, at 294-95. R
117 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 115 (“According to certain very rough R
estimates, the cost of all language services in the all EU institutions amounts to . . .
around C= 2 per person per year.”).
118 Living in the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/
index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2016) (“The EU . . . has 503 million inhabitants.”).
119 EURO-US DOLLAR Exchange Rate, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 31, 2015, 5:07:10
PM), www.bloomberg.com/quote/EURUSD:CUR (listing C= 1 as equivalent to
$1.0856).
120 Colin Robertson, Legal-linguistic Revision of EU Legislative Texts, in 117
LINGUISTIC INSIGHTS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION, LEGAL
DISCOURSE ACROSS LANGUAGES AND CULTURES 51, 52 (Maurizio Gotti &
Christopher Williams eds., 2010).
121 Id.  See also Council of the EU, A Day in the Life of the Lawyer-Linguists,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 1, 2013), www.youtube.com/watch?v=n3c80Xpords; EU Careers,
Inside EU Careers: Law / Lawyer-Linguist, YOUTUBE (Feb. 29, 2012), www.youtube
.com/watch?v=vY1KKtEk1_k.
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• Thorough knowledge of a third official language of the European
Union;
• Successful completion of a suitable course in law, such as a degree
in law, or its equivalent, awarded in the UK or Ireland or having
qualified as a barrister, advocate or solicitor in the UK or Ireland;
• Adequate knowledge of Community/EU law; and
• The ability, though not necessarily from experience, to translate
complex, legal texts.122
Though the exact requirements for a lawyer-linguist position can vary
depending on the EU institution or agency that is hiring, the fundamental
requirements are knowledge of three official EU languages and a rele-
vant law degree.123
Lawyer-linguists work in teams of four or five per language, and are
involved throughout the entire drafting process.124  Under the “Co-deci-
sion” procedure (now known as “ordinary legislative procedure” under
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union),125 lawyer-lin-
guists advise both the European Parliament and Council as they develop
legislation, up to the final moment of adoption.126  Colin Robertson, a
lawyer-linguist working for the Council of the European Union, has
described the role of multilingualism in the EU’s legislative process as
follows:
[T]he Commission drafts; other institutions are involved to give an
opinion, amend, approve, and then the text is considered satisfactory
and ready for finalization.  Drafting takes place on one language ver-
sion, but that does not mean that language remains the basis for
negotiation and drafting throughout.  An important feature of EU
procedures is that the language versions can to some extent become
interchangeable.  Thus the Commission might draft in French and
the Council Presidency select the English translation for negotiation
and amendment in the Council.  In that case the French text becomes
like a translation and is aligned on the revised English model.  Or it
may be the other way round.  Or maybe there is a German original
text, translated, worked on in French, then in English. . . . This inter-
changeability has linguistic implications and it is the task of transla-
122 EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, WORKING AS AN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE
LAWYER LINGUIST AT THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
LUXEMBOURG, curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2009-03/brochure_
en.pdf.
123 Robertson, supra note 120, at 53 (“[B]roadly, the requirement is to possess a R
law degree and at least two foreign languages in addition to [the] mother tongue.”).
124 Id. at 52.  For a brief video of the drafting process in action, see A Day in the
Life of the Lawyer-Linguists, supra note 121. R
125 Legislative Powers, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00004/Legislative-powers (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
126 Robertson, supra note 120, at 60-61. R
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tors and revisers to be aware – and here it is appropriate to
emphasize that the translators and linguistic revisers play a funda-
mental role in the quality of the EU legislative texts since their texts
are those which are being seen by the negotiators and form the basis
on which legal-linguistic revision later takes place.127
It is important to keep in mind that lawyer-linguists rely just as much on
the first half of their title as they do on the second; it is their specialized
legal knowledge, after all, that separates them from traditional translators
and makes them essential to the complex multilingual drafting process
just described.128  With that said, a lawyer-linguist is not necessarily an
expert on the subject matter of a document that they are translating,129
and is not supposed to make substantive textual changes.130  As Robert-
son explains, lawyer-linguists exist to facilitate the legislative process, but
are not themselves the ones doing the legislating.
While working on a document, lawyer-linguists adhere to the principles
of translation discussed above.131  According to Robertson, the process of
“legal-linguistic revision,” which is one of the final steps in the EU legis-
lative process, has two basic stages.132  First, the most recent version of
the source text is “settled,” a process that includes standardizing its lay-
out, double-checking its facts, consulting with relevant experts, and gen-
erally making sure it is as close to a final version as possible.133  Second,
the source text is made available to all lawyer-linguists who will be trans-
lating it, who, after requesting any necessary explanations or clarifications
of the source text, conform their language versions to it.134  This is essen-
tially the same as Lessig’s description of the translation process, in which
a translator first achieves “familiarity” with a source text and then finds
its “equivalence” in the target language.135  In “settling” a text, the law-
yer-linguists achieve “familiarity” with it, and they necessarily find its
“equivalence” as they conform the other language versions to the source.
127 Id. at 61-62.  For Robertson’s biography, see PETER LANG, LINGUISTIC
INSIGHTS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION, LEGAL DISCOURSE ACROSS
LANGUAGES AND CULTURES 338 (Maurizio Gotti & Christopher Williams eds., 2010).
128 See Inside EU Careers: Law / Lawyer-Linguist, supra note 121 (“Lawyer R
linguists are often confused for translators.  We’re not translators; we are responsible
. . . for the quality of legislation.”).
129 Robertson, supra note 120, at 68 (“The legal-linguistic reviser is not a policy R
expert and in general has no background knowledge of the field or text in question.”).
130 Id. at 70-71 (“The text worked on has been agreed by the negotiators as
reflecting what they want and is politically agreed.  This must be respected.”).
131 See supra Part I(B).
132 Robertson, supra note 120, at 62-64. R
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Lessig, supra note 35, at 1194. R
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C. Criticism of the Multilingualism Policy
It would be reasonable to assume that the existence of twenty-four
“equally authentic” versions of the same regulation would serve only to
complicate the judicial process;136 after all, in the United States, dealing
with the ambiguities of legislation written in only one language is already
quite a daunting task.137  However, multiple commentators have sug-
gested that the opposite may be true, and that having a number of official
versions of a given statute actually aids the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (“CJEU”)138 in making its decisions by giving the court a
broader view of the intentions of the legislature.139
In its seminal CILFIT v. Ministry of Health decision, the CJEU stated
that, “it must be borne in mind that Community legislation is drafted in
several languages and that the different language versions are all equally
authentic.  An interpretation of a provision of Community law thus
involves a comparison of the different language versions.”140  When deal-
ing with an ambiguous statute, the CJEU will often explicitly examine the
text across its multiple official translations in an attempt to deduce the
statute’s underlying purpose.141  Take, for example, the following excerpt
from the 1985 case of Commission v. United Kingdom, in which the
CJEU looked at multiple translations of a Regulation in an attempt to
136 See Schilling, supra note 93, at 1240 (“When all . . . language versions are R
equally authentic, and not all of them, considered each on its own, have the same
meaning, it follows that different meanings are equally authentic.”).
137 See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (deciding whether
“proceeds” means “receipts” or “profits” for the purposes of the federal money-
laundering statute), superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter Cmty’s for Great Or.,
515 U.S. 687 (1995) (examining whether the Secretary of the Interior had
appropriately interpreted the word “take” for the purposes of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973).
138 The CJEU is sometimes also referred to as the “European Court of Justice” or
the “ECJ,” but for consistency’s sake, I will use “CJEU” throughout this Note. See,
e.g., European Court of Justice, CITIZENS INFORMATION (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www
.citizensinformation.ie/en/government_in_ireland/european_government/
eu_institutions/european_court_of_justice.html.
139 See generally Lawrence M. Solan, The Interpretation of Multilingual Statutes by
the European Court of Justice, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277 (2009); see also Jan
Engberg, Symposium: Creating and Interpreting Law in a Multilingual Environment:
Panel II: Multilingual Regulation – The EU Experience: Statutory Texts as Instances of
Language(s): Consequences and Limitations on Interpretation, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
1135 (2004).
140 CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, Case No. 238181, 1982 E.C.R. 3415 ¶18.
141 See Solan, supra note 139, at 283 (noting that, for the CJEU, “language R
provides a somewhat unique kind of evidence of purpose,” and that it regards it
specially for that reason).
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determine how it would tax fish obtained in a joint British-Polish fishing
venture:
[I]t should be noted that the phrase ‘extraits de la mer’ or its
equivalent is employed in the Greek, French, Italian and Dutch ver-
sions of Regulation No 802/68 and is capable of meaning both ‘taken
out of the sea’ and ‘separated from the sea.’  Even allowing that the
English version, which uses the phrase ‘taken from the sea’, has the
significance attributed to it by the United Kingdom (‘complete
removal from the water’), the German version of the regulation
employs the term ‘gefangen,’ meaning ‘caught,’ as the United King-
dom itself acknowledges, claiming that ‘it seems . . . to be an inappro-
priate term to use.’142
In the end, the CJEU found that a purely semantic examination of the
Regulation proved ambiguous, and decided the case on policy grounds.143
Even if the multiple language versions of a statute do not provide a deci-
sive answer, they provide at least a useful starting point for statutory
interpretation.  For this reason, the court’s general policy is “to start . . .
with a reading of the . . . various language versions . . . [while ultimately
giving] clear preference to policy-oriented interpretation over linguistic
interpretation.”144  At worst, multilingual legislation can be considered to
be a non-factor in the CJEU’s process.  It certainly does not seem to be
harmful, and if the vast majority of official translations point towards or
away from a proposed interpretation, then it has the potential to aid
judges in their decision-making.
For the purposes of this Note, the most relevant criticism of the Multil-
ingualism Policy is that it does not sufficiently acknowledge speakers of
“minority languages,” which are the various non-dominant languages
spoken throughout the EU member states.145  The EU neither funds nor
directly supports minority languages, despite the fact that a number of
them are more widely spoken than official European languages.146  For
example, the official EU languages of Irish and Maltese have about
275,000 and 520,000 speakers worldwide,147 while Basque, Galician, and
142 Comm’n v. United Kingdom, Case No. 100/84 1985 E.C.R. 1169 ¶15.
143 Id.  ¶¶ 16-18.
144 Łachacz & Man´ko, supra note 109, at 82-83. R
145 See Schilling, supra note 93, at 1241 (“The conclusion of all this is quite clear: R
there is no general principle of Community law requiring the respect of [minority]
language rights.”); Yim, supra note 107, at 133 (“The current policy does not serve the R
purposes of multilingualism because it is merely reinforcing the privileged position of
particular languages.”).
146 Multilingualism, supra note 92 (“[N]ational governments . . . determine R
[minority] languages’ legal status and the extent to which they receive support.”).
147 Irish, ETHNOLOGUE, www.ethnologue.com/language/gle (last visited July 5,
2015); Maltese, ETHNOLOGUE, www.ethnologue.com/language/mlt (last visited July 5,
2015).
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Catalan, minority languages found primarily in Spain, have worldwide
speakership totals of about 540,000, 2.4 million, and 4 million.148  Addi-
tionally, Galician, Basque, and Catalan even have official language status
within Spain; they are co-official with Spanish in the Autonomous Com-
munities of Catalun˜a, the Basque country, and Galicia, respectively.149
Despite this, native speakers of these “minority languages” are not enti-
tled to communicate with nor receive a response from the European
Union without learning a second language.150  The EU already fully
accommodates Irish and Maltese, each of which can be objectively con-
sidered more of a “minority” language in terms of overall number of
speakers than any of the other three languages just discussed.  The EU’s
refusal to recognize widely spoken non-dominant languages seems at best
inconsistent with the lofty representative goals of the Union’s Multil-
ingualism Policy.
Of course, there are a number of reasons for the EU not to throw open
the doors of its Multilingualism Policy to the sixty minority languages cur-
rently spoken across Europe.151 Most practically, it would be prohibi-
tively expensive.  At the moment, the EU has twenty-four official
languages and spends more than C= 1 billion per year on translation;
increasing the number of official languages to eighty-four (which would
be the logical conclusion of a fully inclusive European Multilingualism
Policy) would result in 6,972 potential language pairs and untold billions
of euros more in administrative costs.  Even if the EU were to explicitly
restrict its drafting languages to solely English and French, so long as it
was required to produce official translations of all major documents in
each official language, the number of commonly used language pairs
would be greater than one hundred sixty.  Suffice it to say that while the
ambition and scope of the EU’s Multilingualism Policy are admirable,
and the lawyer-linguist system is a fantastic innovation, the Multilingual-
ism Policy in its current state is open to a number of legitimate represen-
tational criticisms.152
148 Basque, ETHNOLOGUE, www.ethnologue.com/language/eus (last visited July 5,
2015); Galician, ETHNOLOGUE, www.ethnologue.com/language/glg (last visited July 5,
2015); Catalan, ETHNOLOGUE, www.ethnologue.com/language/cat (last visited July 5,
2015).
149 See M. TERESA TURELL, MULTILINGUALISM IN SPAIN: SOCIOLINGUISTIC AND
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF LINGUISTIC MINORITY GROUPS 1 (2000).
150 The EU only recognizes the right to communicate with its institutions in its
official languages. See TFEU arts. 20, 24.
151 Multilingualism, supra note 92. R
152 For more information on the status of minority languages, both in Europe and
around the world, see generally Adeno Addis, Cultural Integrity and Political Unity:
The Politics of Language in Multilingual States, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 719 (2001); Stella
Burch Elias, Regional Minorities, Immigrants, and Migrants: The Reframing of
Minority Language Rights in Europe, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 261 (2010); Moria Paz,
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IV. AN AMERICAN LEGAL TRANSLATION POLICY
A. US and EU Translation Policy Compared
As discussed above, there is no regulation of translation (legal or oth-
erwise) in the United States.153  There are a number of reasons, including
access to justice and evidentiary concerns, that the US should oversee the
legal translation process to at least some degree.154  The European
Union’s Multilingualism Policy presents a uniquely well-developed and
far-reaching example of a governmental translation regime,155 and there
is much that the US can learn from it.
The most important takeaways from the EU’s experience are that,
unsurprisingly, legal translation works best when the translator is trained
in both the law and in translation, and more generally that developing an
effective, wide-ranging translation policy is possible.  That is not to say
that the US should (or even could) adopt the EU system root and branch.
The lack of any official national language makes a direct transplant
impossible, for one, and with over three hundred languages spoken across
the United States,156 giving official recognition to any of them has the
potential to create issues of minority language representation even
greater than those present in the EU.  Additionally, as seen in the Euro-
pean Union discussion above, the costs that would be involved in imple-
menting and maintaining a system requiring mandatory translation of all
major governmental documents into even one or two additional lan-
guages would be astronomical.157
The lack of an official US language actually simplifies the situation
quite a bit, as it places all languages (at least theoretically) on an equal
footing.  While English may be the de facto official language of the
United States, since that status is not de jure at the federal level, there are
no official benefits afforded to it that would need to be extended to lan-
guages officially recognized by a federal translation regime.
B. An American Translation Policy Proposal
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts’ federal inter-
preter certification program provides a good model from which to
start.158  An obvious advantage of the program is its flexibility – its three
tiers allow for a large number of people to serve as court interpreters
while showing a clear preference for more experienced candidates.  Addi-
The Failed Promise of Language Rights: A Critique of the International Language
Rights Regime, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 157 (2013).
153 See supra Part II.
154 Id.
155 See supra Part III.
156 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 15, at 4. R
157 See supra Part III(C).
158 See supra Part II(B); ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 71. R
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tionally, it can be thought of as being “language-neutral,” by which I
mean that a speaker of any language could potentially serve as either a
Professionally Qualified or Ad Hoc Interpreter depending upon their
qualifications.
With that in mind, I suggest that the United States implement a transla-
tion regulation system for the federal courts along the lines of the federal
interpreter certification program, keeping in mind what the EU has
learned about the importance of employing individuals with both legal
and linguistic expertise.159  Such a system should be “language-neutral”
and permit translators of a variety of skill levels to operate within the
system.  A three-tiered system along those lines would look something
like this:
1. Certified Translators: These would be the American equivalent of
the European Union’s lawyer-linguists, and the highest level of
certification available.  To qualify as a Certified Translator, an
individual would have to pass a government issued translation
exam and possess a law degree.  As shown by the EU’s experi-
ence, the law degree is essential to ensure quality translation of
complex legal documents.
2. Professionally Qualified Translators: Of course, the government
cannot be expected to create translation certification exams for
every language used in the United States, and not all otherwise
well-qualified translators will possess law degrees.  A person
could qualify for this level of certification by having been certified
by the American Translator’s Association160 or a similar trade
group.
3. Language Skilled/Ad Hoc Translators: One of the advantages of
the current lack of regulation is the relative ease with which a
certified translation can be prepared, and at least at this lowest
level, it makes sense to largely preserve that.  However, transla-
tors should be required to do more than simply sign off on their
work in front of a notary; since a Language Skilled/Ad Hoc trans-
lator will likely not be appearing in court and their facility with
translation will not necessarily be apparent to a judge, a transla-
tion at this level should at least be accompanied by a form includ-
ing relevant information such as how to contact the translator and
his or her relevant language experience.
Just as the courts prefer Certified Interpreters under the current system
for interpretation,161 there would be a similar preference for Certified
159 See supra Part III(A).
160 See Certification, AM. TRANSLATORS ASSOC., www.atanet.org/certification/
landing_about_certification.php (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
161 See Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. §1827(d) (2012) (“The presiding judicial
officer . . . shall utilize the services of the most available certified interpreter, or when
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Translators under this proposed system.  Given that not all translations
provided to a court are equally important, however, exceptions to that
rule could exist for short, simple documents whose translation is not at
issue.  However, it would obviously be preferable for a Certified or Pro-
fessionally Qualified Translator to provide the translation of a disputed
document or a document that would affect someone’s legal status or the
status of his or her property (e.g. birth certificates, deeds, etc.).
The issue of minority language representation in the European Union,
discussed above, shows how complicated the decision of which languages
to include in a translation policy can be.162  However, there is an obvious
administrative value in courts relying upon government-certified transla-
tors rather than those certified by third parties, and for the government to
certify translators, it will need to develop instruments with which to do
so.  Practically speaking, the greatest need in the courts is likely for Span-
ish-to-English translators,163 but that should not be taken for granted,
and it certainly is not the only translation certification program that
should be developed.
Ideally, the language demographics of the United States would be reg-
ularly monitored to ensure that the proposed translation policy is able to
respond to the country’s changing language needs and develop appropri-
ate translation certification exams accordingly.  Interestingly, such a mon-
itoring apparatus already exists in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
requires the publication of voting materials in multiple languages “where
the Director of the Census determines that more than five per centum of
the citizens of voting age residing in [a] State or political subdivision are
members of a single language minority.”164  By developing certification
exams along these lines (that is, focusing on languages spoken by a per-
centage of citizens above a certain threshold), the government would
avoid the EU’s Irish and Maltese problem, where some relatively little-
spoken languages are accommodated at the expense of other, more
widely spoken languages.
CONCLUSION
The effects of an improper legal translation can be at once very subtle
and incredibly far-reaching, as the “shall” problem in Foster and
no certified interpreter is reasonably available . . . the services of an otherwise
competent interpreter. . . .”).
162 See supra Part III(C).
163 In 2011, 60.5 million Americans reported speaking a language other than
English at home.  Of this group, 37.5 million spoke Spanish instead, and more than
25% of people who spoke Spanish at home did not speak English well or at all.  The
next most widely reported language used at home was Chinese, with 2.8 million
speakers, just under 30% of whom were not able to speak English well or at all. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 15, at 3, 5. R
164 52 U.S.C. §10303(f)(3) (2012).
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Percheman demonstrated.  In order to avoid these unintended conse-
quences, a legal translator should be fully proficient not just in the lan-
guages he or she works in, but also in translation theory and every legal
system involved in a given document.  Despite the risks of relying upon a
bad translation, legal translation in the United States is currently com-
pletely unregulated.  By looking to the European Union’s Multilingual-
ism Policy and to the current system for certifying United States federal
court interpreters, it is possible to sketch out an American legal transla-
tion regulation policy that would both be sufficiently flexible and allow
for more reliable legal translations.  Regardless of whether the system
proposed above is implemented, it is my hope that in the future this criti-
cal yet understudied area of United States legal culture will receive the
attention it deserves.
